Call of Cthulhu

Why Rumskull Will Stay
(or, "Heather Wilson Just Handed General Sanchez's Head to Rumskull on a Silver Platter")

While the world watched the Senate Armed Services Committee meeting, few of us stuck around for the subsequent House version of the same. Those of us who did were treated to the following exchange:

HEATHER WILSON (R-NM): I would like to follow up a little on the line of questioning that Mr. Spratt began, and that has to do with command and control, the lines of authority.

It is my understanding that there was an order given on the 19th of November that effectively put the Abu Ghraib prison under the command of military intelligence.

There's a section of that order that is quoted in General Taguba's report. I do not have the complete copy of the order, but the paragraph says, "Effective immediately, commander of 201st [sic: 205th] Military Intelligence Brigade assumes responsibility for the Baghdad confinement facility and is appointed the forward operating base commander. Units currently at the Abu Ghraib are TACON, tactically controlled, to 205 Military Intelligence Brigade for security of detainees and FOB protection, forwarding operating base protection."

That order effectively put all the MPs in that unit under the command or under the control of military intelligence, which, as I understand it, is contrary to Army regulation. [emphasis added]

Is that order still in effect, or has it been rescinded?

RUMSFELD: General Smith?

L. SMITH: It's been rescinded. The organization under General Miller right now is established so that he works for CJTF-7, General Sanchez. And the M.I. brigade and the M.P. brigade, both work directly for him.

H. WILSON: Who signed that order, and did any of you know...

L. SMITH: The November FRAGO?

H. WILSON: Who signed the order, and did any of you here testifying today know of that change?

L. SMITH: I'm not sure what you mean...

H. WILSON: The 19...

L. SMITH: The November order?

H. WILSON: The 19 November 2003 FRAG order changing the lines of command. Who signed it, and did any of you here today know that it had been signed?

L. SMITH: General Sanchez signed the order, as the CJTF-7 commander.

RUMSFELD: I did not know.

MYERS: I didn't know.

RUMSFELD: It's not the kind of thing we would know.

(UNKNOWN): I did not know.

(UNKNOWN): I did not.

L. SMITH: And I didn't know. I was just arriving at CENTCOM at the time.

Representative Wilson raises a red flag here. A couple of them, in fact. 1) Few outside of CentCom know what is going on at the operational level in Iraq, and 2) General Sanchez is responsible for placing the 800th MP Brigade under TACON to the 205th MI Brigade in contravention to US Army regulations. Hmm, time for a little reading...

Digging into my .pdf copy of "Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade" (aka, "The Taguba Report"), I found this:

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander’s Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties.

Ironically, it was General Sanchez who had appointed MG Taguba to investigate Abu Ghraib and other facilities. In addition, Brigadier General Karpinski was either unaware of that FRAG order, or ignored it. It must have been awkward for Taguba to come back and say, "Boss, you really didn't help matters."

But was Sanchez's November 19th FRAG order illegal? Wilson seems to think so, and there is some debate about this point:

RUMSFELD: I would also add that I do not know whether it's against Army regulations or not, or doctrine or procedures, I just simply don't know the answer to that. And I would not want to leave my silence to suggest agreement with your comment.

SCHOOMAKER: I'm told back here, Congresswoman Wilson, that that's a task organization issue, not a regulation.

H. WILSON: According to Major General Taguba's report, he found that the setting of conditions and the lack of separation of military intelligence from M.P.s was contrary to Army Regulation 109-8 [sic: 190-8--cthulhu], and was a contributing factor to the problems in Abu Ghraib. And I think that's an important factor that warrants some further consideration, that I haven't heard discussion of. And, Secretary, I'd like your response and comment.

RUMSFELD: I'm sorry, did you just ask me a question? I couldn't hear a thing.

SCHOOMAKER: I heard what she said. I think we were addressing a different issue. You talked about tactical control, the M.P.s under it. Now you're talking about doctrinal mission business and Army regulation, and I think those are two things.

You could have M.P.s under the tactical control of the M.I. to do the M.P. doctrinal role, which are to provide a safe and secure environment. When you step over the line and say you now have them setting conditions or participating in interrogation, that's a different issue. And I think you're exactly correct. The Army regulation prohibits that.

But I thought we were addressing a different issue when you first said that. I thought you were addressing the TACON issue.

(For those of you who are interested, a .pdf of AR190-8 can be obtained at the National Institute of Military Justice website. It is 86 pages long.)

Oddly, Taguba never mentions the illegality of FRAGO #1108 vis-a-vis AR 190-8. He merely describes the FRAGO as having exacerbated the ambiguity of the command structure at Abu Ghraib.

In fact, directly addressing AR190-8, Taguba states the following:

The recommendations of MG Miller’s team that the "guard force" be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation sessions."

Military Police...do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions...The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.

3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police...should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with setting "favorable conditions" for subsequent interviews.

10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder’s Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency’s (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI interrogations.

12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40

Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40.

Obviously, Wilson was wrong when she stated that Taguba had found Sanchez's order in violation of AR 190-8. In fact, the only people said to have violated it are the abusers in question, and MG Miller (This is the same Major General Miller that once ruled Gitmo, and is now in charge of Abu Ghraib.).

All FRAGO #1108 did was add to some confusion. BG Karpinski seemed unaware of the order that put her command under TACON to the 205th MI Bgde. Anyone who bothered trying to find out if MI had the authority to order MP personnel to "soften up" detainees would have been confused by this FRAGO. On the one hand, MI did have the authority to give orders to MP's; on the other hand, ordering their direct participation ("softening up") was in violation of AR190-8. Since the 800th MP Bgde never received instruction on AR190-8 prior to deployment to Iraq, MP personnel would have no way of knowing that such MI orders were illegal.

This points to a complicated and systemic problem. It does not, however, exonerate MP personnel from following orders that were obviously immoral. Nor does it lay blame directly on Sanchez's confusing FRAGO #1108. In effect, all that Taguba says on this order is that it made it a bit difficult to know who was in overall charge of the situation.

So why Wilson's pointed accusation?

H. WILSON: Major General Taguba's report says that there was confusion over who was in authority in this prison and that some of the guards may have been taking their direction from the military intelligence interrogators on that unit, and that this order contributed to that confusion, particularly as there were no written standard operating procedures as to how these soldiers should act and what the limits of their authority were.

That seems to me to be a major issue of command and control, and something worthy of further analysis and thought.

SCHOOMAKER: And I think we would agree with that, exactly what you just said.

DUNCAN HUNTER (R-CA) (Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee): (OFF-MIKE) the gentlelady's point, this question. And I think the implication, once again, that what we saw in those pictures may have been directed by the interrogation leadership, which had taken over, which now had a larger role in the prison. I think that's a question that has to be explored and investigated.

Is that question being explored and investigated?

RUMSFELD: It is. The Fay investigation is the one that is looking at military intelligence.

What's it's due date?

MYERS: I think it's several weeks out, if it stays on schedule.

Congresswoman Wilson has obviously read Taguba's report, and read it very thoroughly from the sound of it. She had the same information that I had in compiling this post. In short, she had to have known that what she was charging General Sanchez with, that he had violated AR190-8 and that Taguba had reported as much, was in fact just plain wrong.

It was a lie.

At worst, Geneneral Sanchez is guilty of having made an assumption: That, as per SOE, the 800th MP Bgde had received proper instruction on the handling of POW's as per AR190-8 and the 3rd Geneva Convetion. He was never informed of that ominous ommission in their training until Taguba made him aware of it. In fact, had the 800th MP Bgde been trained on 190-8, they would have known that any order or suggestion to "soften up" detainees was illegal...and we wouldn't be where we are today. But they didn't, and that ambiguity was the green light for those thugs to act out their sick fantasies.

And Wilson knew all of that when she launched into her questioning.

Rumskull had no idea how to handle the accusation because he still hadn't read the Taguba Report. In fact, only Schoomaker had any idea where Wilson was going with her line of questioning, and saw the full implications of her attack (To his credit, only Schoomaker took issue with it.).

What Wilson did was to lay a groundwork for Rumskull to pin this whole tragic affair on to Sanchez. She put General Sanchez squarely into Rumskull's sights. It was Sanchez who gave the confusing FRAG order #1108. He did not consult with the Pentagon first. He never consulted with Rumskull. He wasn't aware that the 800th MP Bgde lacked proper training. He was in command of both the 800th MP and the 205th MI Bgde's. The buck stops on his desk.

Rumskull may have been blindsided by Wilson's allegations, but rest assured: Rumskull will run with this.

Gentlemen, we have found our scapegoat.